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ABSTRACT 
Towards a Political Economy of Industrial Organization: Empirical Regularities 
from Deregulation∗ 
by Tomaso Duso and Lars-Hendrik Röller 
This paper argues that the study of policy incidence in industrial organization needs to 
take the endogeneity of government into account. The point is made by investigating 
whether political considerations are important in terms of understanding the causes and 
effects of deregulation using data provided by the OECD. In particular, we address two 
interrelated questions: (i) do political and institutional factors matter in a systematic way 
in terms of the decision to deregulate, and (ii) if so, what does this imply in terms of the 
policy incidence of deregulation. Our results indicate that political considerations do 
matter. Most importantly, by introducing political and institutional variables into the 
empirical analysis of policy incidence, we find that policy conclusions are substantially 
different from an analysis that treats political factors exogenously. We conclude that the 
evidence is suggestive of the claim that a full understanding of the effect of government 
intervention in the marketplace implies a closer integration of political economy with 
industrial organization. 
 
Keywords: Deregulation, Political Economy, Mobile Telecommunications, Simultaneity 
Bias, OECD 
JEL Classification: C31, D43, D78, L43, L51, L96 
                                                 
∗  Prepared for the Session European Deregulation at the European Economic 
Association  annual conference, August 30th  September 1st 2001 in Lausanne. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Ein politökonomischer Ansatz der Industrieökonomie: 
Empirische Evidenz∗ 
In diesem Beitrag wird die Wechselwirkung zwischen Deregulierungsentscheidungen 
und Marktergebnissen am Beispiel von OECD-Ländern explizit untersucht.  Es wird 
gezeigt, warum eine exogene Betrachtungsweise von Deregulierungspolitik zu einer 
inkonsistenten Einschätzung wirtschaftspolitischer Maßnahmen führen kann. In der 
Arbeit werden erste Ansätze beschrieben, die eine konsistente Analyse ermöglichen.  
Neben politischen Faktoren wird die Rückkoppelung des Marktergebnisses auf die 
Politikentscheidung berücksichtigt und anhand eines neuen Datensatzes für die OECD-
Länder empirisch untersucht. 
 
Folgenden zentralen Forschungsfragen wird anhand der OECD-Deregulierungsdaten 
empirisch nachgegangen.  Erstens, welche politischen und institutionellen Faktoren sind 
bei Deregulierungsentscheidungen von Bedeutung, und zweitens, wie verändert ein 
simultaner Ansatz, der die Wechselwirkung zwischen Politik und Markt zulässt, die 
Wirkungsanalyse von wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen? 
 
Schlagwörter: Deregulierung, Politische Ökonomie, Mobilfunksindustrie, Simultaneität, 
OECD 
 
                                                 
∗  Dieser Beitrag wurde auf Einladung der European Economic Association für die 
Sitzung European Deregulation der Jahrestagung vom 30. August bis 1. 
September 2001 in Lausanne erstellt. 
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After years of reading and writing about optimal policies, one cannot help 
but wonder why observed trade policies are so different from the 
prescription of the normative literature. Of course that literature assumes 
the existence of a benevolent dictator  a species that is all to rare in the 
real world of economic policy making.  Grossman and Helpman 2001. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates whether political considerations are important in terms of 
understanding the effects and the causes of deregulation. There have been a number of 
important areas in economics where political economics (as it is called by Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000) has recently been used in order to explain policy outcomes, such as 
macroeconomics, trade, and public finance. The basic insight is that policy decisions are 
not entrusted to a benevolent dictator, but are endogenously determined outcomes in 
terms of a set of agents, their preferences and constraints.  
 
Relatively little research has focused on introducing political considerations into the 
analysis of microeconomic decision making in the arena of industrial organization, such 
as regulation, competition policy, as well as various types of subsidies. This is insofar 
surprising as one may easily conjecture that decisions by politicians and governmental 
agencies in these areas are potentially rather sensitive to political influences and 
ambition.1  
 
Why is it important to endogenize policy outcomes? We argue in this note that there are 
essentially two interrelated reasons as to why endogenous policy matters.  The first 
reason is that it may be of interest to study the determinants of policy making. For 
instance in the arena of merger control, one may wish to understand the process by 
                                                 
1 For example, Neven and Röller (2001) provide some simple evidence to this regard. They show that 
over 90% of the variation in state aid during the 1980s across EU member states can be explained by 
political and institutional factors. 
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which certain types of mergers are blocked. Is it because effective lobbying by 
competitors or are antitrust agencies simply maximizing consumer surplus? In the area 
of state aid, are subsidies given to correct a market failure, or to serve a political 
constituency. The second reason why endogenous policy matters, is what Besley in 
Case (2000) call policy incidence. There is a large amount of literature that addresses 
the impact of policy on market outcomes, assuming that the policy decision is 
exogenous. Policy incidence is then analyzed through comparative statics, where the 
(exogenous) variation in policy explains market outcomes. However, when policy is 
endogenous (in particular when the market outcomes causally affect the policy decision) 
a simultaneity bias in terms of policy incidence occurs. It is therefore generally 
impossible to obtain a consistent assessment of the impact of a particular policy without 
taking the determinants of policy making into account. 
 
In this short paper we wish to provide some empirical evidence underscoring the 
relevance of including political and institutional factors into the analysis of 
deregulation.  In particular, we address two interrelated questions: (i) do political and 
institutional factors matter in a systematic way in terms of the decision to deregulate, 
and (ii) if so, what does this imply in terms of the policy incidence of deregulation.  
 
We propose to simultaneously estimate the determinants and effects of deregulation and 
apply this approach to a newly created data set made recently available by the OECD. 
We then ask whether the simultaneous approach does lead to different results in terms 
of the impact of deregulation on market outcomes.  
 
It is important to point out that our approach here is purely empirical and purposefully 
reduced-form. We do not explicitly structure our empirical analysis with regard to the 
political environment in which the deregulation decisions across the OECD are taken. 
Rather, we simply take some prominent variables that relate to the theory developed in 
other fields of political economics and ask whether there is any systematic evidence for 
the claim that political economics is essential for policy assessment. We leave it up to 
future research to impose more specific structure and better measures. 
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Finally, it should be emphasized that the above argument applies in principle to many 
policy analysis in other fields.2 Empirical industrial organization has recently developed 
a more structured approach to empirical testing by emphasizing the need to identify 
causal relationships through comparative statics. Similarly, the study of policy incidence 
in industrial organization needs to take the endogeneity of government into account. In 
order to understand the effect of government intervention in the marketplace, it may be 
necessary to integrate politics and industrial organization further, i.e. to move towards a 
political industrial organization.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  We start with a brief review of the literature in political 
economy, emphasizing empirical studies on deregulation. We then introduce an 
econometric approach that incorporates political and institutional factors. Finally, we 
illustrate the approach with the help of a new database made available by the OECD.  
 
 
2. Political Economics 
 
The underlying premises of political economics is that policy is implemented by self-
interested policy-makers. The explicit modeling of political considerations has emerged 
as an important research agenda in several areas of economics.  
 
Starting with the private interest theory of regulation (Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), 
Becker (1983)) economists began to develop models of the political process underlying 
economic policy. Recently, this literature has received renewed interests expanding the 
microfoundations into what is referred to as political economics. A large body of 
theoretical contributions in different fields of economic theory (public finance, 
monetary economics, macroeconomics, trade, regulation, corporate finance) have since 
emerged. Given that a review of this work is well beyond the scope of our paper, we can 
only refer the interested reader to some recent books on the subject and the references 
given therein (Persson and Tabellini (2000), Drazen (2000), Grossman and Helpman 
                                                 
2 The importance of endogenous policy for policy incidence has recently also pointed out by Besley and 
Case (2000). 
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(2001)). Of particular importance to this literature is the electoral competition game (see 
also Besley and Coate (1997)), which has been developed to account for the role of 
different political institutions, the pressure of influence groups, and the agency problem 
among politicians, voters, and governmental agencies (on an agency perspective see 
also Laffont (1999)). Finally, we like to mention a long tradition in political science, 
which has looked at the role of ideology and partisanship as a mechanism that underlies 
policy formation (Alesina and Rosenthal (1995)). 
 
More recently, there have been a number of empirical contributions that attempt to 
assess the determinants of policy. Many such studies have built on the new theoretical 
advances. For instance, Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2001) have made a number of 
empirical contributions analyzing the role of political institutions in shaping fiscal 
policy outcomes. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) 
perform a structural analysis of a lobbying model for trade protection.  Finally, Krozner 
and Strahan (1999) investigate the political factors driving the deregulation of the U.S. 
financial services industry. The empirical literature, however, seems to be in its infancy 
as compared to the state of theoretical analysis.  
 
 
3. The Causes or Effect of Deregulation: single equation approaches 
In terms of the determinants (the cause) of deregulation there are relatively few 
empirical studies. Amongst all industries, it is the telecommunications industry that has 
attracted most interest. Levy and Spiller (1994) perform a descriptive analysis of the 
role of different regulatory institutions in determining the regulatory design for the 
telecommunication industry. Kaserman et al. (1993) and Donald and Sappington (1995, 
1997) are the first econometric studies, which analyze the role of political variables and 
regulatory history in shaping the deregulation and the choice of the price regime in the 
U.S. telecommunications industry (see also Krozner and Strahan (1999) for a study of 
deregulation of bank branching restrictions in the U.S.).  
 
The main conclusion from this literature is that political and regulatory institutions, as 
well as lobbying, matter significantly for the deregulation process. However, the 
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approach is generally a single equation framework, which is not sensitive to 
simultaneity bias stemming from private interest models of regulation. We will pick up 
on this below. Besides, many empirical investigations focus on U.S. industries only, 
thereby not exploring any variation in political and regulatory institutions in an 
international context. 
 
In terms of the effects of deregulation there exist a vast number of empirical studies in 
industrial organization  some structured, some not - that attempt to shed some light on 
the impact of government policies on prices, productivity, or profitability of firms. A 
prominent survey paper with many references that assess the impact of deregulation is 
Winston (1993). The conclusion from this paper is that deregulation has generally 
benefited both consumers and producers (see Winston (1993), Table 6 page 1284), 
namely through reducing prices and increased quality and service as well as increased 
productivity. 
 
Many such studies of policy incidence assume that deregulation is exogenous. Allowing 
for the policy of deregulation to be endogenous, may produce be rather different results. 
This is the topic of this paper.   
 
 
4. Towards a Political IO Approach 
 
In this section we integrate the approach of endogenous policy with the study of policy 
incidence.  In particular, we propose to introduce political economy considerations into 
models of industrial organization. Our main objective here is to provide empirical 
support for the importance of political factors.  
 
The basic set-up involves a simultaneous system of at least two equations. One 
equation, the policy equation is grounded in political economy. It serves to 
endogenizes the policy decision in terms of political, constitutional and other 
institutional factors, agency issues, as well as perhaps ideology (for instance the 
political orientation of the government). Another factor that determines political 
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decision making is the market outcome itself. For instance, in the context of a 
representative democracy model (Besley and Coate (1997)), a policy maker might not 
get elected, unless her policy does have a desired effect (by the electorate) on 
productivity or output.  In this sense, aspects of benevolent policy making may play an 
important role as well.   
 
Let the policy decision be denoted by s and let the market outcome be denoted by q. The 
policy equation may then be given by, 
 
s = f(Political Institutions, Regulatory Institutions, Ideology, q) + ε [1] 
 
One issue in estimating [1] is that q is potentially endogenous: the policy often does 
affect the economic outcome.  This implies that OLS-type estimation will generally not 
provide an unbiased assessment of the underlying determinants of policy making. A 
possibly solution is to estimate a reduced-form version of [1] by dropping q. 
Unfortunately this does not allow the estimation of the impact of q on s.   
 
Note that the specification of [1] is not very structured. In fact, the extent to which 
theory enters into [1] is primarily through the types of variables that determine the 
political environment. Nevertheless, it should be clear that more theory-based 
specifications of the political game can also be accommodated.  
 
The second equation, the market equation accounts for the effect of the policy on the 
market outcome. For simplicity, we abstract from a more structural specification of the 
market game. Staying with the empirical IO perspective we postulate that the market 
output (q) is determined by demand, costs, and market structure variables (such as the 
number of firms). The (reduced form) market output equation can then be written as,3  
 
 q = g(Demand, Costs, Market Structure, s) + ν     [2] 
 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, [2] could be two equations in the tradition of the structural empirical IO approach. In 
other words, one could specify a demand equation and a first-order condition, with the policy (s) 
affecting either or both sides of the market. 
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One of the main objectives in estimation of [2] is to obtain the impact of s on q, i.e. the 
policy incidence. The problem with estimating [2] by OLS is that s is endogenous and 
single equation approaches will be subject to a simultaneity bias. Nevertheless, there is 
a large literature in empirical economics that attempts to estimate equation of the type of 
[2]. Policy suggestions based on this kind of analysis are potentially very misleading. 
We will provide some evidence to this regard below. 
 
The main point we wish to make in this note is that consistent policy analysis of the 
form of [2] is naturally done by jointly estimating [1] and [2]. In other words, the 
political environment in which policy decisions are made matter for the measurement of 
policy incidence. Simultaneous estimation of [1] and [2] provides consistent estimates 
of both the determinants of policy making, as well as of the impact of policy on market 
performance. Econometrically, the above set-up provides for an additional set of 
instruments, namely the political and institutional factors that determine the policy 
through [1]. Given that institutions are rather long lived, they may be as exogenous as 
any other instruments that have traditionally been used in empirical IO. 
 
There is also a small variant of the above set-up. Suppose that the market outcome does 
not affect the policy decision at all. We then have a recursive system of the form, 
s = f(Political Institutions, Regulatory Institutions, Ideology) + η  [3] 
q = g(Demand, Costs, Market Structure, s) + µ 
This is the set-up studied by Besley and Case (2000). In the next section we will 
compare all three specifications:  the traditional single equation approach (OLS), and 
the two approaches that combine political economy with markets (recursive and 
simultaneous estimation).  
 
Before we turn to the evidence, we like to mention two other points. First, it should be 
clear that the above set-up can be applied in a number of different circumstances of 
economic policy making. Take for instance competition policy, in particular merger 
control. The decision by an antitrust agency to block or perhaps allow a merger with 
remedies is dependent on the economic consequences that a merger triggers, such as the 
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impact of the merger on equilibrium price (consumer surplus). In other words, the 
decision by the agency depends on price, while the price also depends on the decision of 
the agency.4 We therefore have relationships of the form of [1] and [2].  As a second 
example consider the policy decision to grant state aid. Clearly state aid is given with 
the intention to correct for a market failure, such as to increase productivity in R&D.  In 
other words, state aid should affect R&D productivity. Moreover, R&D productivity 
also affects the likelihood of obtaining state aid, the direction of which depends on the 
precise political economy model that one has in mind here. In any case, we have to 
content with a simultaneous relationship in order to assess the impact of state aid 
policies on R&D productivity.5 
 
A second point we like to raise is that the endogeneity of policy is a valid concern not 
only for empirical analysis of markets, but also for theory. Treating government action 
as exogenous by investigating the comparative statics of a particular model is subject to 
the same criticism. In fact, the same simultaneity bias exists in theoretical analyses.  
 
 
5. Telecommunication Deregulation in the OECD: an empirical 
example 
This section is an empirical example, which employs the different approaches discussed 
above. The objective is to investigate in the particular context of deregulation whether a 
simultaneous political economy approach does in fact matter empirically.   
 
For this purpose we are using a new database created by the OECD (the OECD 
International Regulation Database), which contains data on deregulation in the mobile 
telecommunication industry from 1993-1997 (see Duso (2001) for a more complete 
description of the data). The OECD database provides information on two measures of 
deregulation, which are based on market structure (see Table 1). The first measure of 
deregulation (ENTRY) takes on the value of 1 if the market structure in digital mobile 
                                                 
4 For a lobbying approach to merger control see Neven and Röller (2001).   
5 For an application to infrastructure allocation using a lobbying approach for equation [1], see Cadot et 
al. (1999). 
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telephony is a monopoly, 2 if duopoly, and 3 otherwise. The second measure 
(DEREGULATION) is an index composed of the number of foreign operators, market 
shares of new entrants, and the ENTRY index defined above.6 Our policy measure of 
deregulation does not address issues such as privatization, price regulation, or state 
subsidies.  
 
For our policy variable (s), we thus use both DEREGULATION and ENTRY. Next, we 
specify the instruments in equation [1], i.e. the political environment of deregulation in 
the OECD (see Table 1). We do this by drawing on the existing theory summarized in 
Section 2.7 For political institutions we use the identical data as Persson and Tabellini.8 
a dummy variable indicating whether the electoral system is a majoritarian or 
proportional (MAJORITARIAN) and secondly a dummy indicating whether the 
political system is a presidential or parliamentary regime (PRESIDENTIAL) (see 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) for details). As a final variable we use information as to 
whether the government is a coalition or one-party government (COALITION).  
 
The second set of variables entering [1] are based on agency issues (see Table 1). The 
OECD data provide information on the regulatory agency in mobile communications. A 
variable capturing the accountability of the regulatory agency (ACCOUNTABILITY) is 
defined as an indicator of whether there is a report duty - usually to either the legislature 
or the relevant ministry. A second variable in the arena of regulatory institutions 
indicates whether the regulatory decision can be overturned by another body and is a 
proxy for the independence of the agency (INDEPENDENCE). One potential issue with 
using these variables is that they may be more relevant for other types of deregulation, 
such as price regulation.  
 
Finally, we use two indicators of the governments general ideology. These variables 
have been used heavily in political sciences and are drawn from the European 
Consortium for Political Research. RILE is defined as the overall political position of 
                                                 
6 The index has been developed and kindly provided by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000)  
7 This theory is developed for other type of policy decisions, besides deregulation. Nevertheless, it may be 
argued that aspects the analysis carry over to an environment where deregulation is the relevant policy 
decision at stake. However, more theory is needed here. 
8 We like to thank Persson and Tabellini for allowing us to use their data. 
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the government in terms of left vs. right scale, while PROREG indicates the 
governments position vis-a-vis deregulation.   
 
Before we turn to equation [2] let us briefly discuss the OLS results of the policy 
equation [1], i.e. estimation of the specification [3]. Due to space constraints we do not 
present these results here.9 The main conclusion from these estimations is that the above 
political and regulatory variables are very significant in terms of explaining 
deregulation (we can explain as much as 60% of the variation). This is, of course, 
consistent with the other empirical studies cited above. Moreover the signs of the effects 
are broadly consistent with the theory. Overall, we take these finding as additional 
evidence indicating the importance of incorporating political economy consideration 
into the study of policy incidence.  
 
We now turn to the specification of the market equation [2].  In terms of market 
outcome (q) two alternative measures are provided in the OECD database. The variable 
PRICE is defined as the total revenue in mobile telecommunications divided by the total 
number of subscribers, i.e. average revenue. The second variable we use is a 
productivity index (PRODUCTIVITY), defined as total subscribers per employee. For 
the exogenous variables we use a number of control variables that are meant to proxy 
demand and cost conditions: GDP, Population, investment per employee, wage 
expenditure per employee, and a time trend. It should be emphasized that there is scope 
for improving the sophistication of the data and the specification underlying [2], for 
instance toward a more structural approach. However, the purpose here is to provide an 
empirical example and provide some first evidence. 
 
 
5.1 Empirical Findings 
 
Given the above data we have estimated a number of specifications, depending on the 
treatment of the error terms (ε, ν, η, µ). Tables 2 and 3 report the most relevant results 
                                                 
9 The interested reader is referred to Duso (2001). Duso also reports results that are controlled for a 
number of econometric issues stemming from the treatment of η and the fact that the regulatory 
variables are discrete. However, the findings we report here are remarkably robust. 
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for our purposes. In particular, the tables only report on the simultaneity between q and 
s, ignoring all the other parameter estimates. For instance, the first row in Table 2 
indicates the impact of PRICE on DEREGULATION in the policy equation [1] for the 
various econometric models (OLS, OLS with random effects, 2SLS, GMM). Similarly, 
the second row reports on the impact of PRODUCTIVITY on DEREGULATION, 
while the last two rows indicate the impact on ENTRY.  
 
Comparison of the various columns of Table 2 (the policy equation [1]) allows us to 
investigate whether the simultaneity between politics and market outcomes matters as 
far as the determinants of policy is concerned. As can be seen, when using the PRICE 
variable, the results between the OLS and the GMM are considerably different. For 
example, the impact of PRICE on the decision to deregulate (which is negative and 
therefore inconsistent with consumer surplus maximization) is much larger and more 
significant for the simultaneous model.  In fact the parameter estimate is nearly 4 times 
larger under the GMM (-0.23), as compared to the simple OLS specification (-0.06).  
For the ENTRY variable the effect is also roughly 4 times larger (increased from 0.17 
to 0.67) and now significant. On the other hand, PRODUCTIVITY is not found to be 
related to the decision to deregulate and hardly affected by simultaneity. 
 
Overall, it appears that the simultaneity of politics and markets may matter significantly 
in terms of the determinants of policy decision-making.10  
 
Results pertaining to the market equations [2] and [3] are given in Table 3.11 As can be 
seen the impact of simultaneity changes the results dramatically. For the PRICE effect 
of deregulation, we find that the traditional OLS results are reversed when the political 
economy is taken into account. For example, the traditional finding under OLS that 
deregulation lowers prices and raises productivity are either reversed (first two rows in 
Table 3 with regard to price effects) or become insignificant (last two rows in Table 3 
with regard to productivity), when the political environment is taken into account. 
                                                 
10We should mention that the political and regulatory factors are generally robust and significant across 
the various specification.  
11The table present the results for the analysis without the agency variables. Including the agency 
variables reduces the number of observations from 93 to 71, which does not affect the overall 
conclusion, but reduces the significance.   
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Our main finding is thus that the political economy does matter significantly. It matters 
for both the determinants of policy decision-making, but also for the analysis of policy 
incidence.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have argued for an integration of political economy considerations into 
the analysis of empirical industrial organization. In particular, we provide some 
empirical evidence regarding two interrelated questions: (i) do political and institutions 
factors matter in a systematic way in terms of the decision to deregulate, and (ii) if so, 
what does this imply in terms of the policy incidence of deregulation.  
 
Our results indicate that political considerations do matter. Most importantly, by 
introducing political and institutional variables into the empirical analysis of policy 
incidence, we find that policy conclusions are substantially different from an analysis 
that treats political factors exogenously.  
 
There are a number of implications of the above findings. First, political and regulatory 
factors introduce a new set of instruments that potentially allow identification of 
industrial organization issues. This undoubtedly requires a more careful treatment of 
identification and the associated comparative statics than the stripped down version of 
an empirical IO model given in [2]. However, variation in political institutions may 
trigger strategic responses by firms that can be used to identify structural parameters.  
Second, and very much related, there is a clear need for more testable theory in this 
area. The relationship between political and regulatory environments and the conduct of 
firms is still an under-researched area of economics. Finally, and again very much 
related, there is a need for better data on political and institutional measures as well as 
linking those to data sets in empirical industrial organization.  
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Table 1 - POLITICAL ECONOMY VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
Deregulation Index: internationalization, market share of entrants, entry in mobile 
telephony 
Entry 1 if monopoly, 2 if duopoly, 3 if competition (digital mobile telephony) 
Majoritarian Majoritarian electoral system (vs. proportional) 
Presidential Presidential regime type (vs. parliamentary regime) 
Coalition Coalition qovernment (vs. one-party government) 
RILE Index: government right-left position  
Proreg Index: government pro-regulation position 
Accountability Report duty (legislature/ministry) 
Independence Decisions cannot be overturned 
Sources: OECD International Regulation Data Base, Persson and Tabellini (1999), European Consortium for 
Political Research. 
 
 
 
Table 2 - POLICY EQUATION 
Dep. Variable OLS OLS 2SLS GMM Indep.  
  Random Eff.   Variable 
Deregulation -0.0574  -0.1049 -0.23364 Price 
 (0.0199)***  (0.0464)** (0.0528)***  
Deregulation 0.0007  -0.0006 -0.0002 Productivity 
 (0.0004)  (0.0006) (0.0006)  
Entry -0.1695 -0.5550 -0.2416 -0.6652 Price 
 (0.1108) (0.9274) (0.2480) (0.2535)**  
Entry  0.0084 0.0056 0.0099 0.0083 Productivity 
 (0.0021)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0033)**  
The control variables are: GDP, Population, Majoritarian, Presidential, RILE, Proreg, Coalition, 
Accountability, Independece. Standard errors in parentheses. Observations = 78 when using the productivity 
measure. Observations = 71 when using the price measure. *** and ** represent significance at the 1% and 
5% level respectively. 
 
 
Table 3 - MARKET EQUATION 
Dep. Var. OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS GMM Indep. 
  Random Eff. Recursive   Variable 
Price -0.6350 -0.7344 0.75684 1.3077 1.7694 Dereg. 
  (0.3587) (0.6745) (0.5308) (0.6803)** (0.5132)  
Price -0.1687 -0.0791 -0.01483 0.4831 0.5594 Entry 
  (0.1060) (0.1406) (0.1838) (0.2552)* (0.1922)***  
Productivity 1.2626 1.2187 0.2301 -0.2816 0.1543 Dereg. 
  (0.3465)*** (0.7066)* (0.5471) (0.6378) (0.4306)  
Productivity 0.4379 0.0944 0.2596 -0.0991 0.0526 Entry  
  (0.0954)*** (0.1065) (0.1814) (0.2325) (0.1614)  
The control variables are: GDP, Population, time trend, log(investment/employees), log(wage expenditure / 
employees). Standard errors in parentheses. Observations = 86 in the Price equation. Observations = 93 in the 
Productivity equation. . ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%,  5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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